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1. INTRODUCTION
John Pendleton, the United States representative to the Ar-
gentine Confederation, described the Argentine Constitution of
1853 as an "almost exact copy of the Constitution of the United
States."' Pendleton's conclusion, albeit exaggerated, demonstrates
how significantly the U.S. Constitution influenced the basic frame-
work of the Argentine Constitution.2 Despite the many textual
similarities between the two constitutions, however, the Argentine
Supreme Court has not always interpreted those provisions in ac-
cordance with United States Supreme Court interpretations.
This Article will examine the influence of the United States
constitutional jurisprudence over the Argentine judiciary. The Ar-
ticle is divided into two general parts. The first part will explore
the structure of the Argentine federal judicial system as estab-
1. Petracchi, Control Judicial en la Argentina, 1987-E L.L. 709 (1987); R. FITZGIBBON,
ARGENTINA: A CHRONOLOGY AND FACT BOOK 10 (1974); contra Quintana, Comparison of the
Constitutional Basis of the United States and Argentine Political Systems, 97 U. PA. L.
REv. 641 (1949).
2. Many of the similarities between the Argentine Constitution and the U.S. Constitu-
tion came about through the influence of Buenos Aires, the largest and wealthiest state.
When the initial Argentine Constitution was approved by a National Convention in 1853,
the province of Buenos Aires had not yet become a part of the federation created by the
Constitution because of competing economic and political interests. See Criscenti, Argen-
tine Confederation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 38 (1974); T.
WELL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR ARGENTINE 17-18 (2d ed. 1974). After several years of political
disputes and a civil war, however, Buenos Aires agreed to join the confederation. Early,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, in THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 253 (1985). As a predicate to membership, Buenos Aires required the
provincial Constitutional Convention to reexamine the Constitution of 1853. F. KIRKPATRICK,
A HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 168 (1931); R. FrrZGIBBON, supra note 1, at 10-11.
Many of the provincial Convention's amendments, notably inspired by the U.S. Constitu-
tion, were adopted by the National Convention in 1860. CONSTITUCION ARGENTINA (1853)
[hereinafter ARGEN. CONST.]. Due to the significance of those amendments, the Argentine
Constitution is commonly referred to as the 1853-1860 Constitution.
The Argentine Constitution is divided into two parts which are preceded by a preamble.
The first part contains the Argentine Bill of Rights. The second part is subdivided into two
titles. Title I covers the federal government and Title II covers the provincial governments.
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lished by the Judiciary Act of 1863.8 This section focuses on the
general aspects of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Second, the
Article will analyze the precedential value of Argentine Supreme
Court decisions. This issue presents a real and peculiar problem in
Argentine constitutional jurisprudence, a jurisprudence influenced
by the U.S. constitutional model and Argentina's civil law
tradition.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
A. Legislative and Judicial Power
The Constitution of Argentina fuses the Spanish colonial
structure, typified by the centralization of power, with the U.S.
federal system. As a result of this blend, a complex framework of
legislative and judicial jurisdiction has emerged. Nonetheless, as in
the United States, Argentina has both federal and provincial court
systems."
The most notable difference between the Argentine and the
U.S. constitutional systems results from article 67(11) of the Ar-
gentine Constitution. This provision expressly authorizes the Ar-
gentine Congress to enact national civil, commercial, penal, min-
ing, and labor codes.5 If the Argentine Congress enacts a code, the
provinces are barred from regulating matters covered by the code.'
The U.S. Congress, on the other hand, does not have this broad
legislative power. In order to legislate with respect to matters tra-
ditionally reserved to the states, it must do so pursuant to some
regulated power like the Commerce Clause, 7 or the taxing or
spending powers.8 Therefore, with regard to intrastate activities, it
3. 48 Leyes Nacionales [L.N.] (1863) (Argen.). The author uses the designation "Law
No" in the text to refer to provisions found in the Leyes Nacionales.
4. T. WEx, supra note 2, at 189.
5. "The Argentine Congress has the power to enact civil, commercial, penal, mining,
labor, and social security codes, such codes not to alter local jurisdiction, their execution
belonging to the federal or provincial courts, depending on which jurisdiction the person or
things come under." ARGEN. CONST. art. 67(11).
6. ARGEN. CONsT. arts. 108 and 310.
7. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
8. Id.; see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (upholding
the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as
amended in 1974, extending its coverage to state and local government employees); Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as
amended in 1940); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (uphold-
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must enact legislation in a piecemeal fashion, embracing only cer-
tain aspects of the law.' As a result, the Argentine codes have a
much broader role than U.S. legislation enacted by virtue of some
regulated power.' 0
Before it was amended in 1860, article 67(11) completely de-
prived provincial courts of jurisdiction over cases involving the in-
terpretation and application of the codes." Under the amended
version of article 67(11), the Argentine Congress retains the power
to enact the codes and the federal and provincial courts are given
subject matter jurisdiction over the codes.' 2 Under article 108 of
the Argentine Constitution, the provinces are prohibited from ex-
ercising the power delegated to the federal government.'3 There-
fore, the provinces may not enact civil, commercial, penal, and
mining codes once the Argentine Congress has enacted them. Re-
garding jurisdiction, article 15 of Law No 48 deprives the Argen-
tine Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over code interpreta-
tions of the highest provincial courts.'
4
Article 100 of the Argentine Constitution provides for federal
court jurisdiction in all cases involving matters governed by the
ing the National Labor Relations Act of 1935). See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
99-191 (11th ed. 1985).
9. Id.
10. Article 67(12) of the Argentine Constitution is almost identical to article I, § 8(3) of
the U.S. Constitution. Regarding intrastate activity, the Argentine Congress is empowered
to enact protective laws and to grant temporary concessions, privileges, and awards in order
to provide for: 1) whatever is conducive to the prosperity of the country; 2) the progress and
welfare of all the provinces; 3) the advancement of learning; 4) the curricula for general and
university education; 5) the promotion of industry; 6) immigration; 7) the construction of
railways and navigable canals; 8) the settlement of government-owned lands; 9) the estab-
lishment of new industries; 10) the importation of foreign capital; and 11) the exploration of
the interior rivers. ARGEN. CONST. art. 67(16). The difference between the U.S. and Argen-
tine constitutional systems may be attributed to different historical experiences. Colonial
Argentina under Spanish rule, known as the Viceroyalty of Rio de La Plata, was governed
by a centralized Spanish structure concentrated in Buenos Aires. T. WEIL, supra note 2, at
11; Hunt, Argentina, in LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: A HANDBOOK 7 (C. Valiz ed.
1968). Hence, provincial legislative independence was considered chaotic and contrary to
tradition. See J.A. GONZALEZ CALDERON, 3 DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINA 164-68
(1923).
11. "The Argentine Congress has the power to enact civil, commercial, penal and min-
ing codes." ARGEN. CONsT. art. 64(11) (amended 1860).
12. ARGEN. CONST. art. 67(11), supra note 5.
13. Id. art. 108.
14. The provincial tribunals' interpretation of the civil, commercial, penal, and mining
codes shall not authorize recurso de apelaci6n (writ of appeal) to the Argentine Supreme
Court even though the codes are national laws by virtue of article 67(11) of the Argentine
Constitution. 48 L.N. art. 15 (1863).
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Constitution and the laws of the federal government. Article 100
specifically states the following:
The Supreme Court and the inferior federal tribunals of the na-
tion have jurisdiction over and decide all cases dealing with mat-
ters governed by the Constitution and the laws of the Nation,
with the exception provided by article 67(11); and by treaties
with foreign nations; all suits affecting ambassadors, public min-
isters, and foreign consuls; with cases in admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; with cases to which the nation is a party; with cases
between two or more provinces; between one province and citi-
zens of another province; between citizens of different provinces;
and between one province or its citizens against a foreign state
or citizen.'5
Although the Argentine Congress has the authority to enact
the various codes, articles 104 and 105 protect the provincial gov-
ernments from a usurpation of their authority. Article 104 states
that the provinces retain all powers not delegated by the Constitu-
tion to the federal government." An unduly broad reading of arti-
cle 67(11), however, may undermine provincial authority. Unfortu-
nately, Argentine Supreme Court decisions have not adequately
reconciled these interests. In fact, the Court has struck down pro-
vincial legislation even though it did not clearly conflict with a fed-
eral code.'" In so doing, the Court has overemphasized notably am-
biguous and vague provisions. The following cases illustrate this
point.
B. Scope of Article 67(11) of the Argentine Constitution
In Abate v. Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Tucumdn,5 the
plaintiff sued a municipality to recover three unpaid promissory
notes drawn by a corporation."9 Judgment was recovered against
15. ARGEN. CONST. art. 100.
16. The provinces retain all powers not delegated by the Constitution to the Federal
Government and those expressly reserved by special covenants at the time of their incorpo-
ration. Id. art. 104. Among these powers is the right to elect governors, legislators, and pro-
vincial officials without intervention from the federal government. Id. art. 105.
17. For a discussion of selected decisions of the Argentine Supreme Court, see infra
notes 18-80 and accompanying text.
18. Judgment of May 28, 1892, Corta Supreme de Justicia de Ia Naci6n, C.J.N., Argen.,
48 Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Ia Naci6n [Fallos] 195.
19. Id. at 195. The Argentine Civil Code classifies municipalities as personas juridicas
(legal entities). C6DIGO CMiv [C6D. Civ.] arts. 32 & 33. Personas jurldicas may be sued in
civil actions and judgments may be levied upon their property. C6D. Civ. art. 42.
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the municipality,2 0 and the lower court issued a writ of execution
for the judgment, which was not satisfied.2 ' The plaintiff obtained
an order for attachment of a municipal market 22 and the munici-
pality demurred, asserting that provincial law prohibited attach-
ment of municipal property assigned to a public service.2 s The fed-
eral district court held that the market could be properly attached
despite the provincial law.24 The Argentine Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that article 42 of the Civil Code allowed the attach-
ment of the municipality's dominio privado (private property), but
not its dominio pablico (public property).2 ' The Court noted that
the dominio petblico of personas juridicas, such as streets, parks,
roads, and establishments destined to public offices and those des-
tined to general communal service, are "out of commerce" and ina-
lienable according to article 2336 of the Civil Code.2 ' The Court
also ruled that judges are not empowered to change the public
destiny of dominio ptblico belonging to personas juridicas or to
order the attachment and execution of such property.'
20. 48 Fallos at 196.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 199. The district court based its opinion on Judgment of Aug. 7, 1883, C.J.N.,
25 Fallos 432. In that case, the Supreme Court had summarily affirmed a federal court deci-
sion authorizing the attachment of a municipal market. Unlike the Abate case, the provin-
cial law did not prohibit the attachment of municipal property. Interestingly, the Supreme
Court in Abate made no mention of this decision.
25. 48 Fallos at 200-201. The Civil Code classifies federal and provincial property as
public or private property of the federal government or of the individual provinces. C6D.
Civ. art. 2339. Ports, bays, banks of navigable rivers, navigable lakes, streets, roads, canals,
and so forth are considered federal or provincial public property. Id. art. 2340. Lands not
owned, mines, property of individuals dying without heirs, fortifications, and vessels belong-
ing to the enemy are examples of federal or provincial private property. Id. art. 2342. The
purpose of the Civil Code's classification is not entirely clear. For instance, article 2341
states that the people have the right to use and enjoy the public property of the federal
government or of the provinces, but that use and enjoyment are subject to the provisions of
the Code, federal law, and local ordinances. No other specific provision addresses the same
question as to the private property of the federal government or the provinces. In addition,
the Code does not specifically provide for the national government or the provinces to alien-
ate their public or private property. In Roman, Spanish, and ancient French law, public
property was also inalienable. See M. MARENHOFF, TRATADO DEL DoMINIO POBLIco 223-24
(1960).
26. 48 Fallos at 200-01. Items are "in commerce" if their alienation is not expressly
prohibited or subject to public authorization. C6D. Civ. art. 2336. Article 2336 is concep-
tually related to article 953 of the Civil Code, which establishes that things not in commerce
cannot be made the object of any acto jurldico (legal transaction) (e.g. a contract, a mort-
gage, an attachment).
27. 48 Fallos at 200. The Court noted that article 66 of the law creating the municipal-
ity of the federal capital of Buenos Aires declares the same principle, establishing that mu-
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The Abate opinion is plagued with faulty assumptions and
omissions. Unfortunately, this is characteristic of the majority of
the Argentine Supreme Court opinions on the subject. For exam-
ple, the Court did not explain why dominio pablico, as classified in
the Civil Code by article 2340, '8 is within the scope of article
2336's'O implicit prohibition of alienation and, by implication, can-
not be attached and eventually sold, while private municipal prop-
erty is not. If the Court reasoned that the dominio pablico men-
tioned in article 2340 is property subject to public authorization, as
article 2336 sets forth, it is difficult to reach an opposite conclusion
in cases involving private provincial or municipal property.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not even refer to article
234430 of the Civil Code, which, if taken together with articles 2336
and 2340,1 would seem to resolve the issue. Article 2344 states
that municipal property is property that the federal government or
the provinces have vested in the municipalities and is alienable in
the manner and form prescribed by special laws."2 The Abate
Court might have reasoned that the province of TucumAn had ex-
cluded the revenues and other dominio pfsblico of the municipality
from the reach of creditors, thus leaving open the possibility of at-
taching other municipal property not necessarily public. This ex-
clusion, however, could be valid to the extent that a municipal
market is dominio p(zblico and, therefore, would fall within the
general terms of articles 2340 and 2336 of the Civil Code."3
In Shary v. Municipalidad del Rosario,3 4 the Supreme Court
declared article 42 of the Civil Code, which establishes the plain-
tiffs right to sue and enforce a judgment against a municipality,
incompatible with article 132 of the Constitution of the province of
Santa F6 and article 14 of the law creating the municipality of Ro-
sario. s6 Both articles prohibited the attachment of municipal reve-
nues and property, but neither expressly distinguished between
public and private municipal property. The Supreme Court re-
nicipal revenues and property effected to the general service of the municipality are immune
from attachment and execution. Id. at 200-201.
28. See supra note 25.
29. See supra note 26.
30. C6D. Crv. art. 2344.
31. Supra notes 25-26.
32. C6D. CIV. art. 2344.
33. Supra notes 25-26.
34. Judgment of Mar. 3, 1906, C.J.N., 103 Fallos 373.
35. Id. at 387-88.
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versed and remanded the case for the lower court to consider
whether there were any other grounds on which the judgment
could be upheld apart from the general language of the provincial
law.8
Rossi y Rocca v. Municipalidad de Tucumdn37 dealt with a
possible conflict between article 196 of the Tucumkn municipalities
law and provisions of the Civil Code.88 The Supreme Court of
Tucumdn denied the plaintiff's post-judgment request for attach-
ment of municipal property on the ground that article 196 of the
provincial municipality law only permitted attachment of one-
fourth of the communal revenues.39 The opinion is not clear as to
whether the request for attachment was for municipal money or
other property (e.g. real estate). Nonetheless, the Argentine Su-
preme Court reversed.40 The Court recognized that all laws regu-
lating private relations among the inhabitants of the Argentine Re-
public fall within the purview of civil and commercial legislation
and therefore fall within congressional power to enact civil and
commercial codes.
4
1
According to article 33(3) of the Civil Code, municipalities are
personas juridicas and, in that capacity, may be sued and the re-
sulting judgments against them enforced.42 Article 196 of the mu-
nicipalities law involved in Rossi y Rocca, protected the municipal-
ity of Tucumin from actions by its creditors and regulated the
form and method by which creditors could exercise their rights.43
Thus, it appeared that article 196 of the provincial municipalities
law infringed upon the subject matter of the Civil Code, an area
exclusively reserved to the Argentine Congress. Consequently, the
decree by which the attachment was denied could not be validly
grounded on article 196 of the provincial municipalities law."
In Rossi y Rocca, the Argentine Supreme Court took a step
toward "clarifying matters." In ruling that the province had legis-
lated on a subject exclusively reserved to the Argentine Congress,
the Court assumed that the regulation of the form and method by
36. Id. at 388-89.
37. Judgment of Aug. 6, 1926, C.J.N., 147 Fallos 29.
38. Id. at 30.
39. Id. at 31.
40. Id. at 36.
41. Id. at 35.
42. See supra note 19.
43. 147 Fa~los at 30.
44. Id. at 35.
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which creditors must judicially exercise and enforce their rights
falls within the exclusive domain of the Civil Code." This assump-
tion, however, is controvertible. The provincial municipal law
seemed more procedural than substantive. In addition, the Su-
preme Court assumed that the Argentine Congress, by enacting ar-
ticle 42 of the Civil Code," preempted the field relating to the en-
forcement process. This point is also debatable. There is no
question that the federal Congress can regulate the substantive ar-
eas of civil law. Articles 67(11)"" and 10848 of the Argentine Consti-
tution vest the federal legislature with the responsibility and au-
thority to enact the codes. Article 42 of the Civil Code, however, is
notoriously vague. One can plausibly argue that under article 42 a
judgment against a municipality is enforceable. However, one must
give that reading practical effect by determining the scope of
enforcement.49
Finally, the Rossi y Rocca Court,50 as the Abate Court before
it, did not mention article 2344, which establishes that municipal
property is alienable in the manner and form prescribed by special
laws.51 One could read article 2344 as an indication that some au-
thority, other than the Civil Code, must provide for action against
municipal property.'2 The provincial law referred to in Rossi y
Rocca"3 may very well be one of the special laws referred to in arti-
cle 2344.
The Gonzdlez v. Provincia de Santiago del Estero54 case is
similar to Rossi y Rocca, except that the defendant was the prov-
ince itself. The province of Santiago del Estero leased real estate
45. Id.
46. See C6D. Civ. art. 42, supra note 19.
47. Supra note 5.
48. Supra note 13 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Abate, supra note 18. The Abate Court considered whether a provincial
law could put a communal market out of the reach of creditors, notwithstanding the generic
language of article 42 of the Civil Code on the enforceability of judgments against munici-
palities. In upholding the provincial law, the Court rested its decision upon an equally broad
reading of article 2340 of the Civil Code, which declares that streets, squares, canals,
bridges, and any other public works constructed for common utility and comfort are the
dominio p,'blico of the province and are prohibited from being alienated according to article
2336 of the Civil Code. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
50. 147 Fallos 29; see supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
51. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
52. Id.
53. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
54. Judgment of Dec. 3, 1930, C.J.N., 159 Fallos 326.
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from GonzAlez, and fell behind in its payments.5 Gonzdlez ob-
tained a favorable judgment, but the province refused to satisfy
the award.56 The district court dismissed Gonzblez's motion to at-
tach provincial property. The civil and commercial court of appeals
of Santiago del Estero held that under article 5 of the Constitution
of Santiago del Estero, a judgment ordering the province to pay a
sum of money was unenforceable until sixth months after the date
of judgment."7 During that six-month period, the legislature was to
establish the form and manner to honor the award.58 The court
added that article 5 of the provincial constitution did not affect
the Civil Code as it was merely a procedural provision, wholly in
accordance with the province's non-delegated powers. " Moreover,
public policy dictated that there be a lapse of time before the judg-
ment against the province should be enforced."
The court noted that the executive, as administrator of the
province, needed to adjust its proceedings in order to match pro-
vincial budgetary constraints." In addition, under the provincial
constitution, the executive was obliged to enforce provincial laws
and to use its resources according to the respective laws.62 The
court noted that as GonzAlez was aware of article 5 of the provin-
cial constitution and did not file a timely challenge to it, he had
submitted himself to its authority. 3
The Supreme Court, citing articles 67(11), 31, and 108 of the
Argentine Constitution, struck down article 5 of the provincial con-
stitution.6 " The Court held that the six-month period between
judgment and enforcement established under that article, affected
the structure of the Civil Code, which does not create a special
benefit in favor of the personas juridicas over which it legislates
but, to the contrary, establishes equality between personas juridi-
cas and individuals.
6 5
The Supreme Court has applied the foregoing principles in tax
55. Id. at 331.
56. Id. at 329.
57. Id. at 329-30.
58. Id. at 330.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 330-31.
64. Id. at 334.
65. Id. at 335; see also C6D. Cnv. arts. 41 & 42.
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refund cases. For example, in Compaihia Sudamericana de
Servicios P(Lblicos v. Provincia de Santa F9,66 the Supreme Court
struck down a local statute which required the complainant to file
a request for an administrative refund proceeding prior to filing
the judicial complaint.6 7 The Court held that the provincial law
implied the establishment of a respite in favor of the province and,
therefore, constituted a regulation of the form and method by
which creditors exercise their rights. 6 In three other cases, among
others, Nidera Argentina, S.A. v. Provincia de Entre Rios, 9 Or-
ganizaci6n Coordinadora Argentina v. Provincia de Tucuimdn,70
and SADE, S.A. v. Provincia de Santa Cruz,"' the Supreme Court
struck down several local statutes of limitations for tax refund ac-
tions because they granted less time to file an action than provided
for under the Civil Code.7
With this overview in mind, one can conclude that the Su-
preme Court is unwilling to recognize meaningful provincial legis-
lative power in areas concerning the interplay between articles
67(11), 104, and 105 of the Argentine Constitution." In most of the
cases mentioned above," the Court apparently followed a central-
ist approach. In other words, when it was unclear as to whether
local law was preempted, the Court ruled against the local legisla-
tion. Indeed, with regard to certain areas, article 67(11) of the Ar-
gentine Constitution centralizes legislative power in the federal
Congress.7" The Argentine Constitution, however, also provides
that all powers not delegated to the federal government are re-
served to the provinces,76 including the authority to establish local
66. Judgment of May 29, 1940, C.J.N., 186 Fallos 531.
67. Id. at 535-36.
68. Id. at 534-35.
69. Judgment of Dec. 4, 1972, C.J.N., 284 Fallos 319.
70. Judgment of Aug. 28, 1979, C.J.N., 301 Fallos 709.
71. Judgment of Feb. 23, 1982, C.J.N., 304 Fallos 163.
72. The Civil Code does not have a statute of limitations dealing specifically with tax
refund actions. The Supreme Court has struck down local limitations periods for tax refund
actions on the ground that such legislation affects the structure of the civil, commercial, and
penal codes. See Judgment of Sept. 1, 1967, C.J.N., 268 Fallos 491; Judgment of May 19,
1967, C.J.N., 267 Fallos 468; Judgment of Apr. 26, 1967, C.J.N., 267 Fallos 363; Judgment of
Aug. 18, 1966, C.J.N., 265 Fallos 211; Judgment of Oct. 23, 1929, C.J.N., 156 Fallos 20;
Judgment of June 23, 1967, C.J.N., 149 Fallos 54.
73. ARGEN. CONST. arts. 67(11), 104, & 105; see supra notes 5, 15-19 and accompanying
text.
74. Supra notes 18-80 and accompanying text.
75. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76. ARGEN. CONsT. art. 104.
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institutions," and the authority to interpret and apply the federal
codes.78 The inherent conflict between these constitutional provi-
sions has compelled the Court to use a balancing test in cases that
do not clearly intrude upon congressional power to enact the codes
or the provisions of the codes themselves. If the Court continues
along the same doctrinal lines, the reservation of power provision
of article 104"e will become meaningless. Based upon the Supreme
Court decisions analyzed above,80 however, it is hard to reach a
contrary conclusion with regard to the scope of provincial power to
legislate.
C. The Federal Judiciary
The organization of the judicial power under the Argentine
Constitution is strikingly similar to that of the U.S. Constitution."'
Article 94 of the Argentine Constitution vests the judicial power in
one Supreme Court and inferior tribunals. 2 Articles 100 and 101
establish federal court jurisdiction."
The strong similarities between article 100 of the Argentine
Constitution and article III, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution are
not accidental. One of the reasons the Argentine Congress
amended the Constitution of 1853 in 1860, was to track the U.S.
Constitution, which at the time, was generally acknowledged as the
best ideological framework carried to fruition. Without the U.S.
framework, the Argentine Constitution would have had many
meaningless sections.8'
77. Id. art. 105.
78. Id. art. 67(11).
79. Id. art. 104.
80. Supra notes 18-80 and accompanying text.
81. Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution addresses the scope of federal jurisdiction.
U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
82. Article 94 of the Argentine Constitution provides that the judicial power of the na-
tion shall be vested in one Supreme Court of Justice and in such other inferior tribunals as
Congress may establish in the territory of the nation. ARGEN. CONST. art. 94.
83. Id. art. 100; see supra text accompanying note 15. Article 101 of the Argentine Con-
stitution provides the following:
In these cases the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction, according
to the rules and exceptions as the Congress shall make; but in all matters con-
cerning ambassadors, ministers, and foreign consuls, and those in which any
province shall be a party, the Court shall exercise original and exclusive
jurisdiction.
Id. art. 101. The original jurisdiction of the Court, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, is
exclusive.
84. E. RAVIONANi, 4 AsAsstnAs CoNsTrrrimsT ARG EnNA 769 (1937); see also Pe-
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Domingo F. Sarmiento, a 19th century liberal politician and
former President of Argentina," commented on the background of
the 1853 Constitution. He noted that an Argentine court may refer
to U.S. cases, cite U.S. constitutional scholars as authority, and
adopt the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution as the genuine
interpretation of the Argentine Constitution. 6
Juan B. Alberdi, the father of the Argentine Constitution of
1853,87 agreed in part with Sarmiento on the relevance of U.S. con-
stitutional law. Alberdi, however, believed that Sarmiento incor-
rectly emphasized the importance of the use of U.S. sources for
interpreting the Argentine Constitution. He based this on the fact
that there are articles of the Argentine Constitution which have no
counterpart or are not rooted in the U.S. Constitution.8
The Supreme Court of Argentina has looked upon U.S. consti-
tutional case law and discussions relating to article III of the U.S.
Constitution when interpreting article 100 of the Argentine Consti-
tution.8a In fact, in one of its earliest decisions, G6mez v. La Na-
cibn,90 the Supreme Court of Argentina stated that there was no
basis to believe that the drafters of the Argentine Constitution had
Spanish legislation in mind when drafting the Argentine Constitu-
tion. The court stated that it was evident that the Argentine fram-
ers sought to imitate the Constitution of the United States."
Therefore, the Court looked to U.S. constitutional principles and
case law in order to properly determine the scope of Argentine fed-
eral court jurisdiction.92
tracchi, supra note 1, at 710.
85. Gallo, Argentina: Society and Politics, 1880-1916, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LATIN AMERICA 359-61 (L. Bethell ed. 1986).
86. J.B. ALBERDI, 10 OBRAS SELECTAs 357-58 (1920).
87. W. STOKES, LATIN AMEICAN POLITICS 458 (1959).
88. J.B. ALERDi, supra note 86, at 358-59. For an article-by-article analysis of the
sources of the Argentine Constitution, see Vanossi, La Influencia de la Constitucibn de los
Estados Unidos de Nortkamerica en la Constituci6n de la Rep(blica Argentina, REv. JuR.
SAN ISIDRO 73-178 (Dec. 1976).
89. See Judgment of June 3, 1904, C.J.N., 99 Fallos 383, 409; Judgment of July 27,
1889, C.J.N., 36 Fallos 394, 398; Judgment of Dec. 3, 1881, C.J.N., 23 Fallos 726; Judgment
of May 2, 1874, C.J.N., 15 Fallos 7. 14; Judgment of Apr. 11, 1874, C.J.N., 14 Fablos 425.
90. Judgment of June 1, 1865, C.J.N., 2 Fallos 36.
91. Id. at 44.
92. Id. As to the importance and practicality of U.S. precedents and doctrine in Argen-
tina, the Supreme Court stated in Judgment of Aug. 21, 1877, C.J.N., 19 Fallos 231, 236,
that it shall use U.S. cases as precedents because Argentina has no specific constitutional
provisions dealing with the issue. The Supreme Court cited Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204 (1821), and the authority of Kent, Jefferson, Story, Cushing, and Wilson. See
also Judgment of July 3, 1897, C.J.N., 68 Fallos 227, 235, in which the Court noted that U.S.
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D. Influence of U.S. Supreme Court Precedents over Argen-
tine Jurisprudence
In construing constitutional provisions modeled after the U.S.
Constitution, the Argentine Supreme Court has often considered
U.S. constitutional precedent and the opinions of U.S. constitu-
tional scholars."s In interpreting the Argentine Constitution, how-
ever, U.S. case law is considered merely persuasive and, not binding
authority. " For example, the Argentine Supreme Court has never
explicitly adopted the U.S. legal doctrines relating to third party
standing," declaratory judgment,90 ripeness, Pullman abstention
and related abstentions, official immunity, and some other judi-
cially-developed limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts."
precedents and doctrine shall serve in Argentina. In the Judgment of Aug. 6, 1937, C.J.N.,
178 Fallos 308, 327, the Court pointed out that it had followed previously the practical
wisdom of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court cited American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed,
192 U.S. 500, 522 (1904); Woodroff v. Paran, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868); and Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
93. Supra note 89-92. See also Judgment of Dec. 11, 1990, C.J.N., - Fallos - (Pe-
tracci, J., en disidencia), citing Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
88 COLUM. L. Rav. 723 (1988); Judgment of Mar. 12, 1987, C.J.N, 310 Fallos 508, citing L.
TamE, AMERICAN CONsTrrTmONAL LAW 636-40, 644 (1978); Judgment of Apr. 21, 1941,
C.J.N., 189 Fallos 308, citing R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 470 (1936). See also Judgment of May 31, 1984, C.J.N, 306
Fallos 516, in which the Argentine Supreme Court used U.S. Supreme Court precedents to
interpret the Commerce Clause, article 67(12) of the Argentine Constitution (e.g., Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)).
94. Many clauses of the U.S. Constitution served as models for the Argentine Constitu-
tion. However, based on this fact alone, one should not conclude that the Argentine Su-
preme Court is bound by U.S. Constitutional case law. In fact, the author has found no
Argentine High Court decision granting precedential authority to a U.S. case or reversing a
lower court for departing from U.S. precedent.
95. Garay, El "interns" para Pedir la Declaracibn de Inconstitucionalidad de las
Normas y la Invocaci6n del Derecho de Terceros, 1989-D L.L. 822 (1989).
96. See Judgment of Aug. 20, 1985, C.J.N., 307 Fallos 1379, where for the first time, the
Supreme Court admitted an action for declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality (citing
Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)). Declaratory judgment actions were ex-
pressly authorized by article 322 of the National Civil and Commercial Procedure Code
since 1967, but the Argentine Supreme Court invariably held that this provision was inap-
plicable in cases where the plaintiff alleged the unconstitutionality of a statute. For an illu-
minating discussion on this topic, see the Opinion of the Procurador General (Attorney
General) 307 Fallos 1379, 1382 n.* (1985). The Office of the Procurador General was estab-
lished by the Judiciary Act of 1862. 27 L.N. (1862). His opinion must be sought by the
Supreme Court in every case where a statute is said to be repugnant to the Constitution.
Nevertheless, his opinion is not binding on the Argentine Supreme Court.
97. The influence of U.S. constitutionalism depends on the degree to which the Argen-
tine Supreme Court justices are aware of these judicially-developed doctrines. However, it is
likely that U.S. constitutional developments are ignored by many, if not most, Argentine
Supreme Court justices. Since 1944, scholarly Argentine works on U.S. constitutional law
have been scarce. Quotations from U.S. cases and of commentators sporadically appear in
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It can be argued that under the doctrine of original intent, the
Argentine Supreme Court should follow U.S. Supreme Court pre-
cedent, at least in cases where the constitutional provision in ques-
tion was modeled in accordance with the U.S Constitution and
where the use of U.S precedent would be compatible with Argen-
tine history.0e Such an argument, however, necessarily raises diffi-
cult questions regarding the history of the Argentine Constitution.
For instance, should U.S. precedent be circumscribed to those de-
cisions rendered prior to 1860, when the Constitution of 1853 was
significantly amended? More difficult questions are raised when
considering the precedential value of U.S. decisions within the
United States. For example, what path should the Argentine Su-
preme Court follow when the United States Supreme Court over-
rules its own prior decisions? What should be the role of concur-
Argentine Supreme Court decisions, depending upon the composition of the Supreme Court
and its understanding of the English language. These quotes have reappeared, especially
during the 1960s and since 1983. The Supreme Court of Argentina rarely cites living Argen-
tine authors.
98. The interpretation of original intent is a thorny issue. Argentina never experienced
a strong debate over original intent as the only legitimate standard for constitutional deci-
sion making. See e.g., R. BIELSA, LA PROTECC16N CONSTITUCIONAL Y EL RECURSO Ex-
TRAORDINARio 69-70 (1936). According to Tomks Jofr6, Argentine Supreme Court decisions
were never resisted due to their "prudence," a term which is neither descriptive nor suffi-
cient to explain whether the Supreme Court departed from the framers' original plan for the
Argentine Constitution. See Jofr6, Pr6logo, in F. Espu., LA SUPREMA CORTE FEDERAL V SU
JURISDICC16N EXTRAORDINARIA 9 (1915). In 1930, the Supreme Court and the judiciary lost
an ideal opportunity to defend the constitutional text and the understanding of the framers
of how it was to function. When the first coup d'etat overthrew the constitutional govern-
ment and imprisoned President Irigoyen, the Supreme Court issued an opinion by which it
acknowledged the legitimacy of the de facto government. Judgement of Oct. 22, 1930,
C.J.N., 158 Fallos 391. The Constitution expressly condemns acts such as sedition. ARGEN.
CONST. art. 22. Part of the Court's decision to recognize the new government was the Gov-
ernment's public commitment to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws
of the nation. Acordada of the Supreme Court Recognizing the National Government, Sept.
24, 1930, C.J.N., 158 Fallos 290. For an english translation of the Acordada, see K. KAST &
K ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 194-95 (1975).
In 1858, Juan B. Alherdi warned:
Respect the elected President and just with this you will be powerful and invin-
cible against all resistance to national organization; for respect for the President
is no more than respect for the Constitution by virtue of which he was elected;
[h]is respect for discipline and subordination that, in politics, as well as in the
army, is key to strength and victory.... [Als long as we keep stupidly in mind
the belief, that wise politics and revolution are equivalent things even though it
was true in 1810; as long as there are publicists who boast and claim to know
how to overturn ministers by cannon shots; as long as people sincerely believe
that a political conspirator is less despicable than a thief, Spanish America loses
all hope to be worthy of international respect.
J.B. ALBERDI, supra note 86, at 251-52.
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ring" and dissenting opinions of the United States Supreme Court
justices in Argentine constitutional interpretation? Should Argen-
tine law schools incorporate required courses on American consti-
tutional law as part of their legal instruction? Should Argentine
Supreme Court justices be expected to become experts in Argen-
tine and American constitutional law? Should the federal govern-
ment publish a Spanish translation of United States Supreme
Court cases?10 0 In answering these questions, it is important to
start with an examination of the structure of the Argentine judici-
ary as established by the Argentine Constitution.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As previously mentioned, articles 100 and 101 of the Argentine
Constitution are modeled after article III, section 2, of the United
States Constitution.0 1 The problems associated with interpreting
both constitutions are, therefore, analogous. As in the United
States, federal courts in Argentina are tribunals of limited subject
matter jurisdiction.1 0 Article 100 of the Constitution provides for
federal judicial review over certain cases in which federal jurisdic-
tion is lacking.0 3 In addition, a court may, sua sponte, raise objec-
tions to subject matter jurisdiction. 104 Unlike in the United States
Supreme Court, however, the Argentine Court has interpreted sub-
ject matter jurisdiction as exclusive. 08 Such exclusivity was the
historical raison d'etre of the 1860 amendment to article 67(11) of
99. For instance, in Judgment of Aug. 28, 1984, C.J.N., 306 Fallos 1125, 1130, the Su-
preme Court quoted Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
100. During the first twenty-five years of Argentine constitutional jurisprudence, many
books on U.S. constitutional law were translated to Spanish by express legislative command.
See 55 L.N. (1863) (Story's ExPosIC16N DE LA CONSTrrucz6N DE LOS ESTAmOS UNIDOS DEL
NORTE); 109 L.N. (1864) (material by Kent dealing with U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
and government); 375 L.N. (1870) (works on federal law by Cushing, Pomeroy, Paschal, and
Lieber); 380 L.N. (1870) (THE FEDERALIST, and Curtis's HISromA DE LA CONSTITUCION DE LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS). See also Egiles, Facultades del Congreso: Reflexiones sobre la Influencia
Doctrinal Norteamericana, in ATrsBUCIONES DEL CONGRESO 1 (1986).
101. See supra notes 15, 83-84 and accompanying text
102. T. WEIL, supra note 2, at 189.
103. ARGEN. CONST. art. 100; see supra text accompanying note 15.
104. See 17.454 L.N. (1967), amended by 22.304 (1980) (C6D. PRoc. Civ. Y COM. arts. 1
& 4). See also L. PALACIO, MANUAL DE DERECHO PROCESAL CtvWL 234 (1967). Identical princi-
ples govern federal jurisdiction in the United States. See FEn. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); E.
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 219-20 (1989).
105. See Judgment of Nov. 5, 1868, C.J.N., 6 Fallos 385; see also 48 L.N. art. 12 (1863).
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the Constitution. 06 Furthermore, as will be noted below, federal
subject matter jurisdiction is improrrogable (not extendable).107
This interpretational difference is largely due to distinctive
textual differences between the two constitutions. The Argentine
Constitution states that the Supreme Court and the inferior tribu-
nals shall "have jurisdiction over and decide all cases dealing with
matters governed by the Constitution and the laws of the Na-
tion."108 This article is notably different from article III, section 2
of the U.S. Constitution, which refers to all cases "arising under
the Constitution or the laws of the Nation.""1 ' It is therefore argu-
able that the Argentine provision is textually broader than the
U.S. constitutional provision. For example, a case may not "arise"
under the Argentine Constitution per se (e.g., the plaintiff's claim
is based on federal law, rather than a specific constitutional provi-
sion); however, the case may still deal with, among other questions,
matters governed by the Constitution to the extent that constitu-
tional adjudication is required.1 However, the conclusion that ar-
ticle 100 of the Argentine Constitution is, as a practical matter,
broader than article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution is
erroneous."'
There are other differences between the Argentine and U.S.
judicial systems. For instance, unlike the United States Judiciary
Act of 1789, the Argentine Judiciary Act of 1863 (Law No 48),"'
grants federal courts of first instance original and exclusive juris-
diction over cases specially governed by the Constitution, laws en-
acted by Congress, and treaties with foreign nations."' Bearing in
106. E. RARIGNANI, supra note 84, at 781-82, 933, 988, § 1052-53; G. BIDART CAMPOS, 1
EL DERCHO CONSTITUCIONAL DEL PoDER, 372 (1967).
107. 48 L.N. art. 12 (1863).
108. ARGEN. CONsT art. 100, supra note 15. See also text accompanying note 15.
109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See supra note 81.
110. Cf. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal.,
463 U.S. 1 (1983) (dealing with federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331), and
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (discussing the arising under
jurisdiction of article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 116-131.
112. 48 L.N. (1863).
113. National sectional judges shall have original jurisdiction in the following cases: (1)
Cases specially governed by the Constitution, the laws enacted by the Congress, and treaties
with foreign nations. Id. art. 2(1) (1863). That jurisdiction is exclusive. Id. art. 12. The
decision of a federal judge declining or affirming jurisdiction was appealable to the Supreme
Court. Id. art. 6. Law No 4055 tacitly abrogated article 6 of Law No 48. In addition, Law No
4055 established the federal courts of appeal and made jurisdictional issues appealable to
them. See 4055 L.N. art. 17(1) (1901); see also Judgment of Oct. 31, 1921, C.J.N., 135 Fallos
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mind that Law No 48 was derived from the United States Judici-
ary Act of 1789, it is apparent that the differences in the Argentine
corollary are original. ' Furthermore, the language of Law No 48 is
unique when compared to the Argentine Constitution."' Although,
the drafters' drew the wording from the first paragraph of article
100 of the Argentine Constitution, article 2(1) of Law No 48 does
not mention the term "all," and the phrase "dealing with matters"
was replaced with the term "specially." ' 8 As a result, the jurisdic-
tion conferred by Law No 48 is quite different in scope from that
articulated in article 100. At this juncture, we turn to judicial in-
terpretations to clarify the scope of jurisdiction with regard to arti-
cle 100 of the Argentine Constitution and article 2(1) of Law No
48.
2. Cases Specially Governed by the Argentine Constitution
There are many Argentine cases in which the plaintiff based
his action upon the Constitution. The typical example is a tax re-
fund action in which the plaintiff, after paying a tax under protest,
challenges the constitutionality a local tax law.
These cases have raised two different but interrelated issues.
The first issue arises with respect to the well-pleaded complaint
rule,1 17 which requires the plaintiff to base the cause of action on
federal law for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction."' Second,
the court must decide whether the nature of the refund action is
based upon the Constitution or steeped in the Civil Code or pro-
vincial laws.' 19
An example illustrating the well-pleaded complaint rule is
22.
114. The U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789 did provide for general, original, and exclusive fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction as did Law No 48. See HART, infra note 118, at 960-66; see
also Judgment of Feb. 14, 1885, C.J.N., 27 Fallos 449; J. GONDRA, JURISDICCION FEDERAL 51,
471 & 485 n. 16 (1944).
115. ARGEN. CONST. art. 100; see supra text at note 21.
116. 48 L.N. art. 2(1) (1863).
117. See infra notes 120-131 and accompanying text.
118. See C6D. PROC. Civ. Y CoM. art. 5 (jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the
complaint alone and not by the defendant's defenses). See also Louisville & Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); P. BAToR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 997-99 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter HART].
119. C6D. PRoc. Crv. v Com. art. 5. See supra note 118.
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Botti v. del Corro,'120 in which the plaintiff sued in federal court to
compel a provincial tax collector to refund taxes levied on wines
the plaintiff introduced into the province of Mendoza.2 ' The
plaintiff claimed that the provincial law was unconstitutional
based on binding Supreme Court precedent. 22 The defendant did
not argue the constitutionality of the provincial law, but instead
relied on the statute of limitations embodied in the Civil Code,
claiming that the plaintiff did not file the complaint within the
prescribed period of time. 2 '
The lower court held that the sole issue to be determined was
whether the statute of limitations had expired, a question governed
by the Civil Code and not by federal law. 2' The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the plaintiff's right of action was based on a
constitutional provision."s' Accordingly, the Court concluded that
federal subject matter jurisdiction is determined by the nature of
the complaint per se and not by the defendant's assent to the is-
sues involved in the complaint.l 8
The conclusion in Botti that the plaintiff's right to a refund is
based on the Constitution and that therefore federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction attaches cannot be reconciled with a textual read-
ing of the Constitution. The Argentine Constitution does not ex-
plicitly address refund actions. 2 7 The Court's failure to explain its
reasoning undermines the soundness of the decision.
With these precedents in mind, one might be tempted to con-
120. Judgment of Apr. 9, 1891, C.J.N., 43 Fallos 220.
121. Id. at 220. The Supreme Court did not specify which articles of the Constitution
had been violated. Articles 9, 10, and 11 may be the provisions the Court had in mind.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 221.
124. Id. at 224.
125. Id. at 225-26.
126. Id. at 225-27. Similarly, in a prior refund case not cited in Botti, Judgment of May
3, 1865 (Mendoza y Hno. v. Provincia de San Luis), C.J.N., 1 Fallos 485, the Supreme Court
had assumed that in such a suit, when the plaintiff attacks a provincial statute on constitu-
tional grounds, his right is based on the Constitution and, consequently, federal subject
matter jurisdiction follows. 1 Fallos at 497.
127. The issue addressed in Botti, whether the right to sue for a refund is itself a crea-
tion of constitutional law, came before the United States Supreme Court in Iowa-Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931); and Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17
(1920). Those cases invoked the fourteenth amendment and struck down state tax statutes
as depriving the plaintiffs of due process. Similarly, in the recent case of McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Dep't of Business Regulation of Fla., 110 S.
Ct. 2238 (1990), the Court held that the Due Process Clause requires a state to afford tax-
payers a meaningful opportunity to secure post-payment relief for taxes already paid pursu-
ant to a tax scheme ultimately found unconstitutional.
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clude that in Argentina a refund action can be based on the Con-
stitution. The Botti decision should be compared with Pilkington
Bros. Ltda. v. Naci6n Argentina"'8 and Garcia v. Provincia de En-
tre Rios,'12 where the Supreme Court held that the right to sue for
a tax refund, on the ground that the tax collection is repugnant to
the Constitution, is based on article 794 of the Civil Code. The
Court rendered this ruling despite the fact that article 794 does
not expressly refer to this kind of case1 0 and in principle should
apply to refund actions between private parties. This decision is
completely at odds with Botti and its progeny.""' Nonetheless, un-
til today, these two lines of cases have quietly coexisted.
3. Subject Matter Removal Cases
The Argentine Supreme Court's struggle with the principle of
subject matter removal jurisdiction serves as an excellent example
of how the Court has tended to construe Argentine federal law in
accordance with the U.S. constitutional model. In 1863, the Argen-
tine Congress authorized the general grant of subject matter re-
moval jurisdiction from state to federal courts through Law No
50,' and established original and exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts with articles 2(1) and 12 of Law No 48.113 Although Law No
50 establishes the procedural requirements defendants must follow
to remove a case to a federal court, the law does not expressly base
removal jurisdiction upon original jurisdiction of the federal
courts." 4 Law No 50 and later the Civil and Commercial Proce-
dural Code130 are silent as to whether removal to federal court is
128. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1940, C.J.N., 188 Fallos 381.
129. Judgment of July 20, 1942, C.J.N., 193 Fallos 231. This case, like the Mendoza
case, was filed under the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction.
130. A payment made by virtue of an obligation, the cause of which is contrary to the
law or to public policy, is also made without cause, unless made in the fulfillment of an
agreement, under which each of the parties was to obtain an unlawful advantage, in which
case demand for its return cannot be made. C6D. Crv. art. 794.
131. 43 Fallos 220; see supra notes 120-127 and accompanying text.
132. 50 L.N. (1863). Note that Law No 50 has been abrogated by the law of civil and
commercial procedure. 17.454 L.N. art. 820 (1967).
133. 48 L.N. arts. 2(1) & 12 (1863).
134. In the United States, removal jurisdiction has been expressly tied to original juris-
diction through the enactment of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, and the
Act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433. See HART, supra note 118, at 1052-53. The effect of
tying removal to original jurisdiction has been that the defendants may only remove a case
from state to federal court if the plaintiff's claim is based on federal law. A defendant may
not remove based solely upon a federal defense to a state law claim. Id. at 1053 n.1.
135. C6D. Psoc. Civ. Y COM. arts. 7-13. In 1967, the Argentine Congress enacted the
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based upon the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
courts over federal claims. Defendants, therefore, have tradition-
ally relied on article 2(1) of Law No 48, establishing original juris-
diction of the federal courts, and on article 12, making jurisdiction
exclusive.3 6 The practical effect of Law No 50, when construed
with Law No 48, is to tie removal jurisdiction to original jurisdic-
tion. Therefore, a defendant may seek removal from state to fed-
eral court by showing that the plaintiff's cause of action is based
on federal law, whereas a defendant may not seek removal if the
defendant merely claims a federal defense to the plaintiff's state
law claim.1 3
7
In one of the first cases dealing with subject matter removal,
Banco de Londres y Rfo de la Plata del Rosario v. Rivadeneira,"'
the Argentine Supreme Court, without mentioning any U.S. au-
thority, relied on concepts similar to those of the well-pleaded
complaint rule employed years later by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank.39
In Rivadeneira, the plaintiff sued Banco de Londres based
upon a provincial statute.10 The bank moved to remove the case to
federal court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the provin-
cial court, alleging that the statute on which the plaintiff relied
was unconstitutional.1 " The provincial court denied the motion
and the bank appealed to the Supreme Court.1"2 In affirming the
provincial court's ruling, the Supreme Court reasoned that al-
though Law No 48 grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases
Civil and Commercial Procedural Code, which abrogated Law No 50.
136. 48 L.N. arts. 2(1) & 12 (1863).
137. This result is exactly the same as in the United States. See HART, supra note 118,
at 1053 n.1.
138. Judgment of May 30, 1871, C.J.N., 10 Faflos 134.
139. 152 U.S. 454, 460-61, 464 (1893). This case generally stands for the proposition
that jurisdiction depends solely upon the plaintiff's allegations and cannot rest on a federal
defense raised by the defendant. See HART, supra note 118, at 995 n.1. See also Matasar &
Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the
Adequate and Independent State Ground Doctrine, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 1291, 1332-33
(1986). This principle, propounded by the plaintiff in Rivadeneira, had been anticipated in
an earlier criminal case, Judgment of Nov. 5, 1868, C.J.N., 6 Fallos 385 (jurisdiction attaches
based upon the complaint in a civil action and the indictment in a criminal action). See also
Judgment of May 8, 1984, C.J.N., 306 Fallos 368 (jurisdiction is determined by the nature of
the complaint itself and not by the defendant's defenses); Judgment of Nov. 18, 1902,
C.J.N., 96 Fallos 366; Judgment of Mar. 3, 1894, C.J.N., 55 Fallos 114; C6D, PROC. CiV.
CoM. art. 5, supra note 118.
140. 10 Fallos at 135-36.
141. Id. at 136.
142. Id.
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"specially" governed by the Constitution, that declaration does not
equally embrace those cases in which a defendant asserts that a
provincial statute is repugnant to the Constitution. " ' Conse-
quently, in the latter kind of case, the Constitution is only indi-
rectly, rather than "specially," applicable because the question
submitted to decision is directly governed by the provincial law. "4
The Court was concerned that defendants might be able to remove
a case merely by alleging the unconstitutionality of the provincial
law, thus causing the jurisdiction of the provincial tribunals to be
usurped by the national tribunals, against the letter and spirit of
the Constitution.'45 To avoid this result, the Court reasoned that
as the Argentine Constitution is the supreme law of the nation, the
provincial authorities are bound thereby, notwithstanding provin-
cial constitutions or laws." 6 The Court further reasoned that pro-
vincial tribunals are enforcers of the national Constitution, and
must therefore interpret and explain it, except when there has
been an application for a recurso extraordinario"7 decision.4 8 The
Court therefore held that a defendant's claim that a provincial law
is unconstitutional is insufficient to deprive provincial tribunals of
jurisdiction to entertain cases litigated by citizens of the same
province and governed by provincial laws.
14
The Rivadeneira Court's reasoning - that article 2(1) of Law
No 48 requires the case to deal specially and directly with the Con-
143. Id. at 137.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 137-38.
146. Id. at 137. Article 31 of the Argentine Constitution provides:
The Constitution, the laws of the nation enacted by the Congress in pursuance
thereof, and treaties with foreign powers are the supreme law of the nation; and
the authorities in every province are bound thereby, notwithstanding any provi-
sion to the contrary which the provincial laws or constitutions may contain, ex-
cepting, for the province of Buenos Aires, the treaties ratified following the Pact
of November 11, 1859.
ARGEN. CONST. art. 31.
147. Recurso extraordinario (extraordinary writ) is the equivalent of the original writ
of error of section 25 of the U.S. Judiciary Act of 1789. Its characteristics are provided in
articles 14-16 of Law No 48. In April 1990, the Congress passed Law No 23.774, making the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction discretionary. 23.774 L.N. art. 2 (1990). For a discus-
sion see Garay, Comentario Sobre las Reformas al Recurso Extraordinario, 1990-E L.L. 984
(1990); Sagoids, El "Writ of Certiorari" Argentino, 1990-C L.L. 717 (1990).
148. 10 Fallos at 137-38.
149. Id. at 138. Under article 100 of the Argentine Constitution, the defendant's chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the provincial statute in Rivadeneira would have been suffi-
cient to allow removal to federal court. ARGEN. CONST. art. 100. However, as discussed above,
the Argentine Congress did not adopt the language of article 100 when it enacted article 2(1)
of Law No 48. 48 L.N. art. 2(1) (1863).
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stitution - was further developed in Casas v. Ferrocarril Central
Argentino.'"5 In that case, the plaintiff sued a railroad company for
property damage caused by the railroad company's locomotive,1 "
basing his claim on article 53 of Law No 531 which deals with the
railroad company liability, " 2 and articles 901, 1068-69, and 1094-
95 of the Civil Code, which address tort liability in general.'5 3 The
plaintiff filed the lawsuit in a provincial court, and the railroad
moved to remove the case to federal court on the ground that the
right of action arose out of article 53 of Law No 531."0
In sustaining federal court jurisdiction, the Argentine Su-
preme Court held that because the right asserted in the complaint
was based on negligence attributed to employees or agents of a
railroad company, and article 53 of the law of national railroads,'15
the case was specially governed by federal law and must therefore
be submitted to federal jurisdiction. 1"
The Court in Casas addressed a potential conflict between the
Civil Code and federal law. Although article 53 of Law No 531 con-
tains a respondeat superior clause, it does not mention the scope
150. Judgment of Dec. 2, 1890, C.J.N., 41 Fallos 260.
151. Id.
152. Railroad companies are directly liable for damage caused to third-persons by the
fault or negligence of railroad employees performing their duties. 531 L.N. art. 53 (1872).
153. 41 Fallos at 260. Article 901 of the Argentine Civil Code, states that the conse-
quences of an act that usually occurs in the natural and ordinary course of events are called
immediate consequences, whereas the consequences resulting solely from the connection of
an act with a different event are called mediate consequences. Mediate consequences which
cannot be foreseen are called incidental consequences. C6D. Civ. art. 901. Under article 1068,
damages occur whenever another person is caused an injury susceptible of pecuniary ap-
praisal, either directly to the things belonging to him or in his possession, or indirectly on
account of the damage done to his person or to his rights or powers. Id. art. 1068. Article
1069 of the Civil Code states that the term 'damage' comprises not only the loss actually
sustained, but also the profits of which the person damaged may have been deprived by the
unlawful act, and which in this Code are designated by the words 'losses' and 'interests.' Id.
art. 1069. Article 1094 provides that when the offense consists of damages due to the de-
struction of a thing belonging to another, the indemnity shall consist of payment for the
thing destroyed; when the destruction of the thing is partial, the indemnity shall consist of
the difference between its present value and its original value. Id. art. 1094. Under article
1095, the right to recover indemnity for the damage caused by offenses against property is
vested in the owner of the thing, in the person having the right of possession or the mere
possession thereof, as the lessee, the bailee in commodatum, or the depositary. Id. art. 1095.
154. 41 Fallos at 261.
155. Article 53 of Law No 531 delineates the manner by which these kind of corpora-
tions are held directly liable to third-persons for injuries caused by their employees'
negligence.
156. 41 Fallos at 261.
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of that liability.157 The Argentine Civil Code, however, does discuss
the scope.1 58 In resolving this conflict, the Court stated that ques-
tions governed by the Civil Code must be decided by the federal
judge "as incidental" to the federal law.5 9 The Court reasoned
that cases based upon constitutional or federal matters generally
involve questions governed by the Civil Code. 60 The Court cau-
tioned that if this was sufficient to deprive federal courts of juris-
diction, then their jurisdiction would be substantially impaired. 8"
It is important to note that the Supreme Court readily ac-
cepted the applicability of the Civil Code to the federal question
involved in Casas.162 The few Code sections upon which the plain-
tiff relied, however, merely established the scope of liability in
cases where someone negligently injures the property of another.' e3
They do not specifically refer to damages caused by railroads in
interstate commerce.' "' Article 53 of Law No 531 does not refer to
the Civil Code as Article 52 of Law No 531 refers to the Commer-
cial Code.1 5 Just as U.S. courts would not assume that the com-
mon law of remedies should apply to a federal cause of action, the
Argentine Supreme Court should not assume that the Civil Code
automatically applies to federal law, even in a country with a civil
law tradition.
When the federal law is silent as to the scope of liability, the
application of a Civil Code provision is not necessary or obligatory.
Although, federal courts may frame a liability issue according to
157. Id.
158. The Civil Code usually governs questions of civil liability of a substantive nature.
The Code generally rules on the relations between private parties. Judgment of Oct. 23,
1929, C.J.N., 156 Fallos 20. However, Article 53 of Law No 531 is almost identical to article
1113 of the Civil Code. Article 1113 states that the obligation of a person who has caused a
damage extends to the damage caused by the persons dependent upon him, or by the things
of which he makes use, or which he has under his care. C6D. Civ. art. 1113.
159. 41 Fallos at 266.
160. Id.
161. Id. The strong similarity between this reasoning and the reasoning of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 819-20 (1824), is noteworthy.
"If this were sufficient to withdraw a case from the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, almost
every case, although involving the construction of a law, would be withdrawn; and a clause
in the constitution . . . would be construed to mean almost nothing." At that time, 1890,
the Argentine Supreme Court was already familiar with Osborn. See 1 Fallos at 488.
162. 41 Fallos at 266.
163. Id. at 265.
164. Id.
165. Article 52 of Law No 531 states that the companies' duties and liability as to por-
ters shall be governed by the provisions of chapter 5, title 3, book 1 of the Commercial Code.
531 L.N. art. 52 (1872).
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the Civil Code, they are not bound to do so under the Argentine
Constitution or the laws of Congress."' Had the Argentine Su-
preme Court considered this possibility, perhaps the jurisdictional
issue could have been disposed of more easily.
These subject matter removal cases illustrate the tendency of
the Argentine Supreme Court to interpret federal law under the
same principles used in the United States. For example, even
though Law No 50 does not tie subject matter jurisdiction to origi-
nal and exclusive jurisdiction,16 as do the U.S. Judiciary Acts of
March 3, 1887 and August 13, 1888,1"8 the Argentine Supreme
Court has construed Law No 50 and the Civil and Commercial
Procedural Code together with Law No 48 to create that effect."6 9
Moreover, the Court has required that cases deal specially and di-
rectly with federal law under article 2(1) of Law No 48,70 similar
to the well-pleaded complaint rule in the United States.171
III. STARE DECISIS AND THE BINDING EFFECT OF ARGENTINE
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS
A. Introduction
The Argentine Supreme Court has yet to adopt a clear and
definite position regarding the applicability of the Anglo-American
doctrine of stare decisis to the Argentine constitutional context. 1 2
Before examining this question, one must bear in mind that before
and after its formal declaration of political independence from
Spain in 1816,"' Argentina's legal culture identified itself with the
civil law tradition. Countries belonging to the civil law tradition
tend to acknowledge jurisprudencia as a persuasive source of
166. For an interesting approach to legal reasoning in the interpretation of the Argen-
tine Civil Code, see Carri6, Judge Made Law Under a Civil Code, 41 LA. L. REv. 993 (1981).
167. 50 L.N. (1863).
168. Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552; Judiciary Act of Aug. 13, 1888, 25 Stat.
433.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 132-137.
170. 48 L.N. art. 2(1) (1863).
171. See supra note 115-119 and accompanying text.
172. Even though the question is not a new one, after Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), it seems difficult to foresee, at least for a foreign
observer, what role stare decisis will play in U.S. constitutional law. See Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 2343-45
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) and Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union, 490 U.S. 164 (1989). But see Monaghan, supra note 102, at 748-670.
173. T. Win,, supra note 2, at 14.
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law.174 In one sense, the multifaceted word jurisprudencia de-
scribes a continuum of similar cases decided alike.'7 5 However,
even when jurisprudencia is used in this sense, prior decisions are
considered persuasive but not binding.'"" They assist the judge in
answering a legal problem, but the judge is not compelled to follow
them.177 A court is free to adopt a different position even with re-
gard to its own precedents, as long as the decision or rationale is
not incoherent or capricious.'1
7
In the civil law system, rules of law are embodied in pre-ex-
isting codes, statutes, or decrees, and courts are obliged to follow
the laws, not prior decisions.179 Notwithstanding this, purposefully
or not, some courts in civil law countries, Argentina in particular,
have followed a different path with regard to the weight of their
own prior decisions.8 0 It is not altogether clear whether these
judges are attempting to adopt the principle of stare decisis.'5 1
This practice was first used almost mechanically, using U.S. prece-
dents as genuine interpretations of similar Argentine constitutional
clauses. Once the Argentine Supreme Court decisions accumulated,
they were then offered as authority for subsequent rulings."8 2
The Argentine Constitution was modeled substantially after
the U.S. Constitution' and, like the U.S. Constitution, was
drafted in very broad terms.'" The Argentine Constitution pro-
claims majestic and sweeping principles, much broader than provi-
174. For a discussion of the civil law system see J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADi-
TION (2d ed. 1985).
175. C. NINO, Introducci6n al Anidisis del Derecho 152 (2d ed. 1980).
176. Id.; J. HALL, 1 INsTrrUTA OR LA JURISPRUDENCIA xxvii (2d ed. 1905); J. Llambias, 1
TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL: PARTE GENRAL 79-80 (10th ed.).
177. Id.
178. Id. See also Judgment of Apr. 8, 1959, C.J.N., 243 Fallos 259.
179. J. CUENTA ROA, FuEmS DEL DEECHO 147, 168-70 (1982).
180. Id.
181. See infra part 111(B); see also Judgment of Apr. 14, 1888, C.J.N., 33 Fallos 162,
199 (Zabaleria, J. en disidencia); Judgment of Dec. 6, 1881, C.J.N., 23 Fallos 726, 741
(Gorostiaga, J., en disidencia).
182. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
183. See supra part II(D).
184. See E. RAVIGNANI, supra note 84, at 811. Consider the following constitutional
clauses: 1) "All inhabitants are equal under the law," ARGEN. CONST. art. 16; 2) "The prop-
erty is inviolable," id. art 17; 3) "The private action of men that in no way offend public
order or morality, nor injure a third party, are reserved only to God and exempted from the
authority of judges," id. art 19; and 4) "The declarations, rights and guarantees enumerated
in the Constitution shall not be construed as a denial of other rights and guarantees not
enumerated, but based on the principle of the people's sovereignty and on the republican
form of government," id. art. 33.
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sions generally found in codes. 85 In the abstract, it is easier to au-
thoritatively ground a decision in a code provision than in the
Constitution.5 6 A code generally contains not only substantive
rules (e.g., principles, rules, and general standards), but also reme-
dies. In contrast, the United States Supreme Court in adjudicating
the U.S. Constitution must frequently frame or infer the applicable
substantive rule and, more often than not, the remedy. This type
of constitutional interpretation is completely at odds with the civil
law tradition, where the framing of rules and remedies falls within
the legislative domain.1s'
As in the United States, the Argentine Constitution is the su-
preme law of the land. Therefore, the Argentine Supreme Court
may feel compelled to justify its constitutional decisions more con-
vincingly than the lower courts.' 8 In relying on precedent, the Ar-
gentine Supreme Court has sought a fair and consistent method of
legitimately resolving constitutional disputes. 189 The question,
however, still remains: just how much should precedent matter in a
civil law country? 90
B. The Supreme Court and Its Own Precedents
The Argentine Supreme Court has expressly referred to stare
decisis and its binding effect on several occasions. For instance, in
Baretta v. Provincia de C6rdoba191 an issue arose as to the applica-
bility of a case decided while the Baretta case was pending. 192 The
Argentine Supreme Court stated that it would be extremely incon-
venient for the community if precedents were not duly considered
185. See generally ARGEN. CONST.
186. This assertion, however, can be qualified. Codes also contain broad principles,
rules or standards (e.g., good faith, abuse of rights, due care) and judges frequently have to
infer the substantive rules applicable to the case before them.
187. See G. CAluu6, REcuRso DE ArW'ao Y TtCNICA JUDIciAL 29 (2d. ed. 1987).
188. To paraphrase an often quoted sentence, in the U.S. as well as in Argentina, it is a
Constitution that the Supreme Court is expounding. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
189. "If courts are viewed as unbound by precedent, and the law as no more than what
the last court said, considerable efforts would be expended to get control of such an institu-
tion -- with judicial independence and public confidence greatly weakened." Monaghan,
supra note 93, at 753.
190. For an analysis of the use and effects of precedent in the United States, see
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571 (1987).
191. Judgment of May 15, 1939, C.J.N., 183 Fallos 409.
192. Id. at 412-13.
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and consequently followed.19S Although it does not necessarily fol-
low that precedent is decisive in every case, or that constitutional
questions are subject to the principle of stare decisis without reser-
vation, when the precedent being considered is "not mistaken or
inconvenient" it should apply.'94
Because the Baretta Court did not adequately explain its rea-
soning, many questions were left unanswered. For instance, the
Court did not explain what was meant by "mistaken and inconve-
nient" precedent? Nor did the Court did establish any objective
criteria for determining when precedent should be considered
"mistaken or inconvenient." The Court's qualified notion of stare
decisis, with its "mistaken and inconvenient" exception, is thus so
broad that it can hardly be considered a principle of stare decisis
at all.
Indeed, an examination of Argentine case law fails to disclose
a line of precedent that expressly follows this approach. In cases
where the Argentine Supreme Court has decided to move away
from controlling precedents, the apparent ground for such devia-
tion was either a new majority on the Court or changing conditions
(e.g., legal, social, political, and economic). 95 A less plausible
ground may have been the Court's lack of familiarity with the
enormous quantity of prior decisions. Indeed, until April 1990, the
jurisdiction of the Argentine Supreme Court was mandatory.' Re-
markably, the Court decided an average of four thousand cases a
year.19 7
1. Political Instability and Stare Decisis in Argentina
Political instability was a constant feature of Argentine life for
fifty-three years (1930-1983).198 During that time, Argentina exper-
193. Id. at 413.
194. Id. In support of this proposition the Argentine. Supreme Court cited W. WL-
LOUGHBY, 1 THE CONSTrrTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 74 (2d ed. 1929).
195. See infra note 201; see also Judgment of Sept. 5, 1958, C.J.N., 241 Fallos 291;
Judgment of Dec. 7 1934, C.J.N., 172 Fallos 21; Judgment of Aug. 21, 1922, C.J.N., 137
Fallos 47.
196. 23.774 L.N. (1990).
197. Lynch & Stanga, Reformas en la Corte Suprema: Investigaci6n Sobre las Condi-
ciones de Trabajo, Cumplimiento de su Labor y Propuestas para su Reorganizacibn (Foro
de Estudios sobre la Administracibn de Justicia Buenos Aires: Informe 1/1987).
198. See Early, supra note 2, at 254-58; see generally S. CALVERT & P. CALVERT, ARGEN-
TINA POLITICAL CULTURE AND INSTABILITY (1989); E. PALACIO, HISToRIA DE LA ARGENTINA
(1988).
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ienced several coups d'etat, and even a new Constitution which re-
mained in force between 1949-1955.199 Furthermore, on seven dif-
ferent occasions, the Supreme Court was either totally or partially
restructured, which resulted in new majorities and halted jurispru-
dential continuity.200 These sudden changes put the legitimacy of
Supreme Court precedent at issue. In other words, it was ques-
tioned whether a Supreme Court appointed by a duly elected gov-
ernment should be bound by precedents handed down by a Su-
preme Court appointed by a de facto government. Arguably, it
would be absurd to expect that a constitutionally appointed Su-
preme Court would be obliged to follow prior decisions rendered
by a non-constitutionally appointed predecessor. When a Supreme
Court appointed by a de facto government interprets the Constitu-
tion, its spurious origin undermines its authority and its constitu-
tional interpretations. Its decisions may at most be viewed as per-
suasive, but not binding.20'
199. This Constitution remained in force during Per6n's government. R. FrrZGmBON,
supra note 1, at 20-22.
200. J. MILLER, M.A. GELLI, & S. CAYUso, 2 CONSTITUC16N Y PODER PoLIfTICO: JuRIs-
PRUDENCIA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA Y T CNICAS PARA SU INTERPRETACI6N 1156-57 (1987) [here-
inafter 2 J. MILLER]. According to article 96 of the Argentine Constitution, the justices of
the Supreme Court and of the lower courts shall hold office as long as they maintain their
good conduct and shall receive for their services a compensation that shall be determined by
law and that cannot be diminished in any way during their tenure. ARGEN. CONST. art. 96.
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
201. The Supreme Court of Argentina has overruled its own precedents many times
regardless of the legitimacy of the Courts which handed down those precedents. The Court's
practice differs from that of the United States in that it does not always expressly acknowl-
edge that it is overruling a prior decision. Consequently, a state of confusion abounds. In
Judgment of May 20, 1976, C.J.N., 294 Fallos 430, a completely new Supreme Court (ap-
pointed in 1976, after a coup d'etat) expressly overruled a whole line of precedents as to the
federal nature of social security laws. See Judgment of Aug. 8, 1974, C.J.N., 289 Fallos 185.
In Judgment of May 17, 1977, C.J.N., 297 Fallos 500, the Supreme Court overruled Judg-
ment of Oct. 18, 1973, C.J.N., 287 Fallos 79. In matters of exclusion of federal jurisdiction
from certain kind of cases, a completely new Supreme Court, whose members were ap-
pointed in 1983 by the elected democratic government, expressly overruled prior cases in
Judgment of Dec. 6, 1984, C.J.N., 306 Fallos 1872, 1880. In Judgment of April 8, 1986,
C.J.N., 308 Fallos 490, the Court overruled a whole line of precedents as to the highest
provincial courts' requirement to the effect of recurso extraordinario. In Judgment of Nov.
8, 1988, C.J.N., 1989-B L.L. 351 (1988), a 2-2-1 plurality opinion implicitly overruled the
approach used in Judgment of Oct. 22, 1974, C.J.N., 290 Fallos 83. Argentine Court history
confirms Justice Scalia's assertion that "[o]verrulings of precedent rarely occur without a
change in the Court's personnel." South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Garro, Eficacia y Autoridad del Precedente Constitucional
en America Latina: Las Lecciones del Derecho Comparado, reprinted in 20 U. MIAMI IN-
TaR-AM. L. REV. 473 (1989); Diaz Cant6n, Cosa Juzgada Constitucional, 57 E.D. 815, 823
(1975). The Argentine history of coups d'ktat is generally accompanied by the removal of
the members of the Supreme Court and the appointment of new justices. So it was in 1955,
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2. Political Stability and Stare Decisis in Argentina
Despite these periods of instability, Argentina has also exper-
ienced periods of institutional stability."' Democracy and the con-
comitant changes it brings aside, the Court must still grapple with
the binding effect of precedent.
In Sejean v. Zaks de Sejean,1s0 a three-two majority of the
Supreme Court declared article 64 of Law No 23932' regulating
civil marriage and prohibiting remarriage by divorced persons un-
constitutional.105 At the same time, the Argentine Congress was
considering a bill aimed at abrogating the subsequent marriage
prohibition. When the bill passed and the judgment was rendered,
both were generally celebrated, despite criticism from a few
commentators.
Would it be possible for the Court to overrule that decision?
Professor Bidart Campos argues that although the Supreme Court
followed Sejean in subsequent cases, the Sejean case is very re-
cent and has not established a following.2 06 Recalling the doctrine
of jurisprudencia,'0 7 it is evident that Bidart Campos is cognizant
of the civil law tradition regarding jurisprudencia constante (con-
tinuum of prior cases). 20 8 This continuum represents a stable and
settled rule. Although Bidart's argument may be understandable if
applied to civil and commercial cases, where the various panels of
the same appellate court 09 may have different, and even contradic-
tory, interpretations about the same question of law, it is hardly
justifiable when used in reference to Supreme Court decisions. As a
1966, and 1976. See 2 J. MILER, supra note 200. Each return to democracy results in the
removal (or resignation) of the preceding justices and the appointment of new ones. This
institutional instability contributed to the practice of overruling, but, generally speaking,
was not as ominous or perverse as it could have been. On the other hand, unlike the United
States, Argentina never witnessed a radical intellectual shift like the one taking place now
on the U.S. Supreme Court. Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HAsv. L. REv. 43, 44-45 (1989).
202. "General Jos6 Uriburu's coup of September 1930, bloodless though it was, marked
Argentina's sharpest turn from democracy since independence with parallels to that a cen-
tury before." Hunt, supra note 10, at 15.
203. Judgment of Nov. 27, 1986, C.J.N., 308 Fallos 2268.
204. 2393 L.N. art. 64 (1888).
205. 308 Fallos at 2287.
206. See Garro, supra note 201, at 484.
207. See supra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
208. Id.
209. Lavib, Argentine, in I-A INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA Comp. L A-35 (1972) (courts of ap-
peal are generally divided into salas (panels) with three members each).
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general principle, once the Argentine Supreme Court has decided a
case, both its holding and its ratio decidendi should be applied to
subsequent cases. Furthermore, unlike a court of appeals, the Su-
preme Court is not divided into panels; rather, the Constitution
vests the judicial power in one Supreme Court21 0 consisting of nine
ministros (justices)).2 1'
The uncertainty underlying Bidart Campos' statement may
also be rooted in the three-two margin that decided Sejean. The
majority's narrow margin of victory arguably leads one to conclude
that the minority opinion may be worthy of consideration. Argen-
tine law implicitly authorizes a Justice to dissent.21 2 Often, today's
dissent becomes tomorrow's majority opinion. 1 8 If, however, the
Court is to strictly follow stare decisis, what becomes the function
of dissent?
Arguably, if stare decisis is rigidly followed, dissenting be-
comes useless. Under this scenario, if one combines the binding ef-
fect of precedent with the maxim that cases are decided by a col-
lective body according to majority rule, the would-be dissenter is
duty-bound to follow the majority view, notwithstanding his own
opinion. Thus, if what counts for stare decisis purposes (and for
the outcome of the case) is the majority's view, the above argument
would require the minority to follow the majority's opinion.2 1'
This argument is virtually impossible to maintain." 5 First, the
Argentine legal order authorizes a Justice to dissent.2 18 Second,
this argument would require a would-be dissenting Justice to re-
place his will for majority reason, obliging him to support some-
thing in which he does not believe. Reasoned decision-making is an
210. AnGEN. CONST. art. 94.
211. 27 L.N. art. 6 (1862). Technically, Argentina's national justice system includes the
Supreme Court and the Procurador General. Id. Law No 23.774, enacted by the new Per-
onist administration, increased the number of Supreme Court justices from five to nine.
27.774 L.N. art. 1 (1990).
212. In cases where the constitutionality of a statute is at issue, the Court's decision
must be by an absolute majority of the members of the Court and, in case of disagreement,
by a majority of opinions. 1285 L.N. art. 23 (1958). But cf. 27 L.N. art. 9 (1862) (Supreme
Court decisions must be rendered by the vote of the absolute majority).
213. Judgment of Sept. 22, 1887, C.J.N., 32 Fallos 120, 137, 142 (de la Torre &
Ibargilren, J.J., en disidencia); Judgment of Aug. 1, 1885, C.J.N., 28 Fallos 406, 409 (Frias,
J., en disidencia). Justice FrIas was the lone dissenter in Acevedo, but, along with two new
justices, he ended up in the Sojo majority.
214. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
215. However, it is not difficult to imagine a system of judicial review under which
unanimity of the Court would be necessary to make declarations of unconstitutionality.
216. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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indispensable and cherished value of the judicial process in general
and constitutional adjudication in particular. Although dissenting
opinions partially reflect this value, their role should be kept in
proper perspective and judges should strive to achieve
agreement. 17
One must also consider that strict adherence to stare decisis
can lead to inconsistencies in the Court's constitutional adjudica-
tion. If a decision is rendered by a narrow majority, a subsequent
case involving similar factual and legal grounds may yield the ad-
dition of the "swing vote." There are, however, ramifications that
follow from this sort of ideological conversion. For example, schol-
ars would question such a change, particularly if it occurred close
to the first case and without any obvious factors to justify it. How
would the legal community perceive the Court's inconsistency re-
garding the rule of law? Certainly, if precedent is to mean any-
thing, predictability should have a bearing on constitutional adju-
dication. After all, as former Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S.
Supreme Court reminds us, the Constitution is "the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation."2 8 For this reason, any theory
about the binding effect of precedent must address the institu-
tional role of majority and dissenting (and even concurring) opin-
ions in constitutional adjudication.
A strict view of stare decisis would seem to posit that constitu-
tional interpretation is immutable, but such an argument is mis-
placed.2 ' 9 Experience and constantly evolving societal attitudes are
two extra-constitutional factors that are vital to any serious at-
tempt at constitutional adjudication. The Argentine Constitution
was meant to govern a dynamic society - and must be flexible to
adapt to the various crises of human affairs.2 0 A consideration of
these two extra-constitutional factors in today's Argentine life
would lead one to conclude that Sejean should not be overruled.
217. As Professor Monaghan puts it, "[c]ollective thought is more than an academic
abstraction about the nature of a court. . . it [is] an intrinsic aspect of the 'Supreme Court'
established by [article 94 of the Argentine Constitution]." He goes on to state that, "[tio say
that each member of that Court takes an oath to support the Constitution as he sees it, not
as others see it, does not detract from this point." Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opin-
ions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv. 1, 23 (1979) (footnote omitted).
218. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
219. Professor Harry W. Jones has noted that the doctrine of precedent "is not what a
[legal] philosopher would call a categorical imperative but a rule of imperfect obligation."
Jones, Dyson Distinguished Lecture: Precedent and Policy in Constitutional Law, 4 PACE
L. REv. 11, 24 (1983).
220. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819).
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That case reflects not only Argentine society's expectations as seen
through the Court's eyes, but also the principles put into effect
thereafter by Congress. Sejean simply does not have, in Professor
Monaghan's words, "some palpable adverse consequences beyond
its existence. 22
1
A look at Argentina's recent past reveals a country in chaos.
The period between 1930 and 1983 was tainted with pathological
breaks of the constitutional order, overt and covert unfulfillment
of the law, official authoritarianism, pervasive economic decline,
and endemic stagflation 222 Thematically, those years were filled
with irreconcilable disagreement, mainly because Argentine society
was unable to respect a system suffering from such problems. Even
military governments, which are always backed by at least part of
the society,223 were overthrown by their own followers. Argentina
needs a profound change, and part of this change must consist of
attaining stability, fairness, predictability, and efficiency, values
which are curiously, yet commonly, attributed to precedent. Practi-
cally speaking, it would be absurd to expect Supreme Court rulings
to act as the vanguard for positive change in Argentine society.
Nevertheless, as one of the three branches of government, the
Court can, and does, make a difference.
C. Vertical Reach of Precedent
As suggested above, the horizontal reach of stare decisis has
been limited by the effect of dissenting opinions.224 Yet the vertical
reach of the doctrine of stare decisis is generally more far-reach-
ing.2 25 As a general principle of American jurisprudence, when the
Supreme Court decides a U.S. constitutional question, its holding
binds every lower court, state or federal, addressing the same con-
stitutional issue. In Argentina, on the other hand, this principle is
not yet settled. Historically, two trends have developed.
In Videla v. Garcia Aguilera,226 an early decision involving the
binding effect of Supreme Court judgments on inferior courts, the
Supreme Court seemed to endorse stare decisis by summarily af-
221. Monaghan, supra note 93, at 758.
222. See Early, supra note 2; S. CAI.VERT & P. CALVERT, supra note 198.
223. S. CALvERT & P. CALVERT, supra note 198, at 268.
224. Supra notes 216-218 and accompanying text.
225. Schauer, supra note 190, at 576; H. JoNza, J. KEnNOCHAN, & A. MuRPHY. LEGAL
METHOD: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (1980).
226. Judgment of Apr. 9, 1870, C.J.N., 9 Fallos 53.
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firming the lower court's decision.22 7 The federal judge in that case
stated in obiter dictum that federal courts must adjust their doc-
trine and decisions to those rendered by the Supreme Court in
analogous cases.228 The Videla Court's stance in many ways resem-
bles the U.S. Supreme Court practice of summary affirmance. 228 In
cases like Videla, the Court's judgment is generally extremely
brief: "In accordance with the grounds stated therein, the judg-
ment of . . . is affirmed," or language to that effect. This brevity
inevitably raises problems of interpretation, for it is not clear
whether the Supreme Court approves the whole opinion, some
parts of it, or just the holding of the case. In addition, the distinc-
tion between holding, dictum, and ratio decidendi is difficult to
recognize when the Court affirms a decision por sus fundamentos
(by its foundation). Professor N~stor Sagii's analysis of Videla as-
sumes that by affirming the grounds supporting a case under re-
view, the Supreme Court of Argentina affirms the whole judg-
ment.23" First, Sagti6s notes that the Supreme Court accepted the
federal judge's statement about the binding effect of Supreme
Court decisions because it affirmed the appealed judgment pursu-
ant to the grounds stated in the judgment.23 1 However, the same
author warns the reader of the ambiguity and uncertainty that un-
227. Id. at 55.
228. Id. at 54.
229. On summary affirmances in the U.S. see generally R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN, & S.
SHAPIRO, SUnPREME COURT PRAcrica 295-96 (6th ed. 1986); for a discussion of the preceden-
tisl value of summary dispositions see Simpson, Turning Over the Reins: The Abolition of
the Mandatory Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297,
320-28 (1978).
230. N. SAGOtS, 1 RECURSO EXTRAORDINARIO 160 (1984). The Supreme Court of Argen-
tina adopted this view in Judgment of July 4, 1985, C.J.N., 307 Fallos 1094. Bielsa, a strong
opponent to the U.S. casuistic approach, adhered to the undifferentiated approach. R.
BImLSA, supra note 98, at 16, 286-87. But see Judgment of May 30, 1871, C.J.N., 10 Fallos
134, 139, in which the Supreme Court set aside an argument posited by the lower court,
because it was not dispositive of the case. In Judgment of Sept. 22, 1887, C.J.N., 32 Fallos
120, the majority dismissed an original habeas corpus writ for lack of jurisdiction pursuant
to article 20 of Law No 48. This decision runs counter to three prior cases decided on the
merits: Judgment of Aug. 1, 1885, C.J.N., 28 Fallos 406; Judgment of Aug. 21, 1877, C.J.N.,
19 Fallos 231; Judgment of Sept. 22, 1870, C.J.N., 9 Fallos 382. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court distinguished these three cases on the grounds that they had not dealt with the scope
and constitutionality of article 20 of Law No 48. See also Judgment of Sept. 13, 1984, C.J.N,
306 Fallos 1363, in which the Supreme Court explained the holding of the Judgment of Mar.
17, 1885, C.J.N., 28 Fallos 78. The Palacios Court had affirmed the lower court's opinion
according to the grounds stated in that opinion. Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 532 n.5
(1974) ("[W]hen questions of jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silen-
tio, this Court has never considered itself bound when a subsequent case finally brings the
jurisdictional issue before us.").
231. N. SAGOtS, supra note 230, at 160.
[Vol. 22:2-3
FEDERALISM IN ARGENTINA
derlie that expression, and correctly states that such an expression
does not clarify whether the Court accepted all or part of the rea-
sons mentioned by the federal judge (there were three)."' Unfortu-
nately, Sagf0is ends his analysis here and reverts to his original,
undifferentiated approach.2"
In Pastorino v. Ronillon,28' the Supreme Court, again under
the guise of the same laconic reference, affirmed a federal judge's
decision which stated that the precedents established by the Su-
preme Court impose a "moral" obligation on inferior courts.2"5
However, Supreme Court decisions do not "legally" oblige inferior
courts unless the Supreme Court is reversing the lower court.2 3 6
Thereafter, in Cerdmica San Lorenzo,237 the Court held that a
lower court decision which departs from precedent, without pro-
viding new grounds which would justify the overruling of the pre-
cedent, lacks an adequate foundation and must therefore be re-
versed. 238 On one level, this decision is contradictory. The Supreme
Court cannot hold that lower courts have no real legal obligation
to follow Supreme Court precedent, while simultaneously holding
that a lower court which departs from Supreme Court precedent
must furnish novel grounds for disregarding it, or else the Supreme
Court will reverse. If a court must provide new grounds to justify
its departure from Supreme Court precedent, there can be no bet-
ter reason than by supporting that obligation with some kind of
binding precedent.
Additionally, the Supreme Court's conclusion was reached tor-
tuously and thus needs some explanation. In supporting the Cer-
dmica San Lorenzo decision, 33 the Supreme Court cited three
cases, Pastorino,2 40 Santin v. Impuestos Internos,24 1 and Pereyra
Iraola v. Provincia de C6rdoba.24 2 Both Pastorino, which calls for a
moral obligation to follow precedent,2 43 and Santin, which accepts
232. Id. at 161.
233. Id. at 170.
234. Judgment of June 23, 1883, C.J.N., 25 Fallos 364.
235. Id. at 368.
236. Id.
237. Judgment of July 4, 1985, C.J.N., 307 Fallos 1094.
238. Id. at 1096-97.
239. Id. at 1097.
240. 25 Fallos at 364.
241. Judgment of Oct. 6, 1948, C.J.N., 212 Fallos 51.
242. Judgment of Oct. 15, 1948, C.J.N., 212 Fallos 160.
243. 25 Fallos at 368.
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a departure based on new and justifiable controverting grounds,2"
admit a relative binding effect of Supreme Court precedents. The
latter case, Pereyra Iraola, stresses that discarding Supreme Court
precedents will damage constitutional order.24 5 Briefly stated, Pas-
torino and Santin go further than Pereyra Iraola with regard to
the binding effect of precedent but fall short of providing prece-
dent with a clear institutional authority.
Furthermore, the established rule is misleading. According to
the Court in Cermica San Lorenzo, the rebellious inferior court
has to provide "new grounds" which justify the overruling of pre-
cedent.2 46 This notion not only undermines the weight of prece-
dent, but also perverts the principles that precedential theory
seeks to promote.
D. The Demise of Precedent
In Sergio L. B. Pulcini y Oscar A. Dobla,2 47 a criminal case, a
federal appellate court, pursuant to Law No 20.771248 had con-
victed the appellants for possession of narcotics. 24 9 The defendants
appealed to the Supreme Court, invoking the Court's authority
under Gustavo M. Basterrica [sic] y Alejandro C. Capalbo.50 In
Basterrica, the Court by a three-two majority opinion had declared
Law No 20.771 unconstitutional as long as it criminalized the pos-
session of drugs for personal consumption.2 51 In Pulcini y Dobla,
the Supreme Court, however, dismissed the case for want of juris-
diction and let the convictions stand in direct opposition to the
Basterrica decision.2 52
The Court recited the principles announced in Cerdimica2 "
Because the Supreme Court is the final judicial authority in Argen-
tina, the Court reasoned, inferior tribunals are duty-bound to fol-
low its decisions.2 " Nonetheless, the Court inexplicably concluded
244. 212 Fallos at 59.
245. Id. at 160.
246. 307 Fallos at 1096-97.
247. Judgment of Oct. 26, 1989, C.J.N., 1990-B L.L. 421 (1990).
248. 20.771 L.N. art. 6 (1974).
249. 1990-B L.L. at 421.
250. Judgment of Aug. 29, 1986, C.J.N., 308 Fallos 1392. The Supreme Court recently
overruled Basterrica in Judgment of Dec. 11, 1990, C.J.N., - Fallos - , a 7-2 decision.
251. 308 Fallos at 1420.
252. 1990-B L.L. at 421.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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that this obligation was not cast in stone, because inferior courts
may ignore precedent as long as the lower court provides proper
arguments to deviate from the precedent.26 6
The judicial gloss quickly gives way upon careful scrutiny. The
Court has handicapped the doctrine of stare decisis. If an inferior
court can unabashedly question a Supreme Court decision, the
idea of binding precedent becomes academic. Any rational person
knows that there are usually two sides to an argument, especially
legal issues which are controvertible. New arguments and support
are easy to articulate. Hence, the new grounds standard is unwork-
able in the realm of precedent. In spite of its practical shortfalls,
lower courts use the new grounds standard to decide cases contrary
to established precedent. The new grounds standard effectively de-
stroys the finality of authority vested in the Supreme Court. Not
surprisingly, the Supreme Court overruled Basterrica, only four
years after it had handed down that case."'6
1. The Final Interpreter of the Constitution
From its inception, the Argentine Supreme Court declared it-
self the final interpreter of the Constitution.2 Nevertheless, the
Court has given out mixed signals on that score. For example, in
Juan R. Di Mascio,2 65 the Supreme Court said that its role as final
interpreter must be understood with reference not only to the un-
reviewable nature of its decisions, but also to the finality of those
decisions, as they are rendered after both parties have exhausted
all judicial avenues.269
As Di Mascio illustrates, the Supreme Court puts more em-
phasis on procedural rather than substantive matters. Today, the
Supreme Court is the ultimate court to which one can appeal, and
its decisions are therefore final and unreviewable.2e0 It is crucial to
the judicial system that lower courts give due deference to consti-
tutional decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in its capacity
as final interpreter of the Constitution.
255. Id.
256. Judgment of Dec. 11, 1990, C.J.N., - Fallos - (1990).
257. 1 Fallos 340.
258. Judgment of Dec. 1, 1988, C.J.N., 1989-B L.L. 417 (1989).
259. Id. at 422.
260. See Judgment of Aug. 8, 1872, C.J.N., 12 Fallos 135 (questioning the res judicata
effect of the Supreme Court decision rendered in the same case one year before, on the
grounds that the decision was mistaken).
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The Argentine Supreme Court was aware of the finality issue
as discussed in Mendoza y Hno.261 The province of San Luis had
argued that in Argentina, like in the United States, a province
could not be originally sued in the Supreme Court by a citizen of
another state.2 "2 However, the Court pointed out that in Chisholm
v. Georgia,2 5 the United States Supreme Court had affirmed its
original jurisdiction in a similar situation.2 4 The Argentine Court
also noted that in Chisholm, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed
itself the final interpreter of the U.S. Constitution and that to
withdraw this type of case from the U.S. Court's jurisdiction would
necessitate an amendment to the U.S. Constitution.2 65 In contrast,
the Argentine Constitution of 1853-1860 does not have a provision
similar to the eleventh amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The
Argentine Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the elev-
enth amendment not only because the Argentine Constitution did
not adopt it, but also because that amendment was recognized as
being crucial to the U.S. Supreme Court' s adherence to precedent
in subsequent cases.2 6 This characteristic is perhaps the most im-
portant enabler for the Argentine Supreme Court to act as the fi-
nal interpreter of the Argentine Constitution.
The Court's working doctrine as to the unreviewable nature of
the case at bar and to the prospective scope of the rule embodied
in Di Mascio is complicated. In fact, if one were unaware of the
Court's working doctrine, one would probably confuse the doctrine
of res judicata with the final nature of the Court's decision-making.
The Supreme Court's role as final interpreter can be under-
stood as having tremendous effect, whether or not stare decisis is
given formal recognition. If we view the Supreme Court's role as
final interpreter in light of article 31 of the Argentine Constitu-
tion, 6 7 the inescapable conclusion is that inferior courts are bound
by Supreme Court precedents.
261. 1 Fallos at 495-96.
262. Id. at 486.
263. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 419 (1793).
264. 1 Fallos at 496.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Article 31 of the Argentine Constitution provides that the Constitution, the laws of
the nation enacted by the Congress in pursuance thereof, and treaties with foreign powers
are the supreme law of the nation; and the authorities in every province are bound thereby,
notwithstanding any provision to the contrary which the provincial laws or constitutions
may contain, excepting for the province of Buenos Aires, the treaties ratified following the
Pact of November 11, 1859. ARGEN. CONST. art. 31.
[Vol. 22:2-3
FEDERALISM IN ARGENTINA
When the Supreme Court decides a case and establishes a con-
stitutional rule, principle, or standard, the Court is giving a final
and ultimate interpretation of the Constitution not only for that
case, but also for subsequent cases. If every authority, national or
provincial, is governed by the Constitution, then every inferior
court is bound by the constitutional rule, principle, or standard
laid down by the Supreme Court in its capacity as the final inter-
preter of the Constitution.
Otherwise, if lower courts can question Supreme Court doc-
trine in similar cases to those already decided upon, as the Su-
preme Court authorized under Cerdmica68 and Pulcini y Dobla,2 9
Supreme Court precedents interpreting the Constitution will al-
ways remain subject to review by inferior courts.
2. Inferior Court Departure From Precedents and the Procedural
Scheme Resulting From Pulcini y Dobla
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Basterrica had de-
clared Law No 20.771 unconstitutional in 1986.270 In Pulcini y Do-
bla, however, the federal appellate court upheld the constitutional-
ity of Law No 20.771 in October of 1989, accepting arguments not
reported in the Basterrica case. 7 1 Nowhere in the Pulcini y Dobla
opinion did the federal appellate court quote specific language
from the cited cases 272 Furthermore, the appellate court justified
its upholding of the statute on the ground that these arguments
had not been considered by the Supreme Court when deciding
Basterrica .27 Although the appellants' lawyer argued for reversal
based on the Basterrica holding, he did not expressly challenge the
appellate court's novel arguments. 74 Because of the appellants'
omissions, the Supreme Court, in considering a recurso de apela-
ci6n, decided not to address the constitutional arguments raised by
the appellants and dismissed the recurso de apelaci6n.2 75 The
Court noted that the appellants' omissions prevented the Court
from knowing the grounds upon which the appellants' claim was
268. 307 Falloe 1094.
269. 1990-B L.L. 421.
270. See supra text accompanying note 252.
271. 1990-B L.L. 421.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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denied by the court of appeals2 7 '
It is incredible that the Supreme Court has sanctioned such a
harsh and burdensome a rule. A rule that under Cerdmica imposed
a minor burden on an inferior court, evolved into a retroactively
applied burden on the appellants, who had to argue the validity of
a Supreme Court decision.17
In any event, and apart from the absurd results which follow
from the Court's decision, the appellants' omissions were justified.
They relied on a Supreme Court precedent, a decision by the final
interpreter of the Argentine Constitution.
Lastly, the procedural scheme framed by the Supreme Court
is confusing. Under Argentine civil and criminal procedure, a
unique precedent, or even a string of precedents, does not legally
oblige either inferior courts of the same jurisdiction or panels of
the same court of appeals. However, once a court of appeals sitting
en banc establishes the legal interpretation ascribable to a code's
rule, that doctrinal interpretation is binding on all the panels and
inferior courts. 7 8 All cases involving that rule must be decided
alike. Procedural codes27 do not expressly allow departures from
en banc decisions. Lower court judges are authorized to propound
their own interpretations of the rule at issue, 80 but they are bound
to decide the case according to the principle of law established by
the en banc decision.
2 8 1
The Supreme Court's apparent conception of its role under
the above framework found in the codes leads one to the following
conclusions: (1) Lower courts are always bound by en banc court of
appeals decisions involving questions of ordinary or non-federal
law; (2) however, lower court judges are not bound by Supreme
Court precedents on questions of constitutional law. Thus, it ap-
pears that in constitutional matters, unlike in questions of ordi-
nary laws, stability, certainty, predictability, fairness, and effi-
ciency do not take priority. Argentines should take note that such
a posture is too extravagant to maintain, at least when one intends
276. See supra notes 247-255.
277. In a recent case, Judgment of Apr. 15, 1986, C.J.N., 308 Fallos 552, the Supreme
Court noted that certain cases may only have a prospective effect, not a retrospective one.
278. See C6D. Paoc. Civ. Y COM. art. 303.
279. See C6D. PRoc. Civ. Y COM. arts. 288-303.
280. See id. art. 303 (en banc decisions are binding on inferior judges, but the judges
are authorized to express their personal opinions on the subject).
281. See C6D. Piaoc. Crv. Y COM. art 303.
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to take the Constitution and Supreme Court opinions seriously.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has discussed some aspects of Argentine federal-
ism, the judiciary, and constitutional adjudication. For those una-
ware of the similarities between the Constitution of the United
States and that of Argentina, it is hoped that this piece was in-
formative and useful. Due to these similarities, many problems
confronted daily by the Argentine Supreme Court are analogous to
those faced by the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, the Ar-
gentine Court has often followed the U.S. Supreme Court in a vari-
ety of areas.
Compared with the U.S. Supreme Court, the binding force of
Argentine Supreme Court decisions differs remarkably. One might
be tempted to explain away this incongruity by the absence of
stare decisis and the influence of the civil law tradition. If stare
decisis is not controlling, it follows that Argentine Supreme Court
opinions do not have binding force on inferior tribunals. This view
presupposes that stare decisis is the only way to justify the binding
force of decisions rendered by a constitutional Supreme Court.
This is not necessarily so. The Argentine Constitution and Su-
preme Court decisions allow room to recognize the binding force of
Supreme Court precedent. Such values as fairness, certainty, fore-
seeability, stability, and efficiency are not only promoted by prece-
dent but also are fundamental to the notion of government subject
to a written constitution and committed to the equal application of
law.
One inevitably wonders why the Argentine Supreme Court
does not adopt this point of view. There is no simple answer. Per-
haps one reason is that as a result of a turbulent institutional past,
many values and principles were lost - the original idea of a writ-
ten Constitution, the Supreme Court as its final interpreter, the
judicial branch as a power equal to the Congress and the Execu-
tive, and the Court as the independent head of the Judiciary. Oth-
erwise, it is inconceivable that the Supreme Court should tolerate
the inferior tribunals' disregard of High Court authority in their
frequent departure from Supreme Court precedents. Such an intel-
lectually "rebellious" attitude undermines the authority and the
proper functioning of an hierarchal system. From a pragmatic
point of view, it is undeniable that this posture promotes litigation
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and threatens to swamp the already overloaded legal system. Fur-
thermore, if the Supreme Court is going to allow inferior courts to
depart from its constitutional rulings, why should administrative
officials, the Executive, and the Legislature restrain themselves as
well?
The upshot of all this is a chaotic, anarchical scheme, where
anything goes. One of the most pernicious results of this wavering
doctrine is the loss of respect for the rule of law. But the most
dramatic effect of current constitutional jurisprudence in Argen-
tina is the undermining of the very concept of government by a
written constitution in conjunction with a final and independent
interpreter - the Supreme Court.
